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Abstract
A perceived need to increase nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for
domestic monetary policy and a tendency to less wage moderation are likely
to promote bargaining co-ordination and social pacts in the EMU. But such
co-ordination is not likely to be sustainable in the long run, as it conflicts with
other forces working in the direction of decentralization and deunionisation.
Although monetary unification will strengthen the incentives for higher-level
transnational co-ordination of wage bargaining, such a development is
improbable because of the co-ordination costs involved. If transnational co-
ordination develops, it is most likely to occur within multinational firms.
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Monetary unification in Europe is an example of a fundamental regime change, which
according to the Lucas critique could change established behavioural relationships. A
key candidate to examine is wage setting. This paper surveys the arguments on how
the EMU is likely to affect wage bargaining.
I distinguish between two dimensions: (i) the effect on the flexibility of nominal
wages in the case of macroeconomic shocks, and thus on the cyclical sensitivity of
employment and output; and (ii) the effect on equilibrium real wages, and thus on
equilibrium unemployment, or more loosely on the average levels of real wages and
unemployment over the business cycle.
Monetary unification can affect wage outcomes either directly, because it changes
the incentives of wage setters given existing labour-market institutions, or indirectly,
because it leads to changes in these institutions. I treat both aspects, but the main
focus is on the effects on wage-bargaining institutions, as this issue has not been
discussed very much. I shall leave aside how the EMU may affect the incentives for
governments to reform other labour-market institutions, such as unemployment
insurance, active labour-market programmes or employment protection legislation,
which also influence the outcomes of wage bargaining.
1
The outline is as follows. Section 2 discusses how the EMU is likely to affect
money-wage flexibility with given bargaining institutions. Section 3 analyses how
bargaining institutions themselves may change in response to a perceived greater need
for money-wage flexibility. More precisely, the focus is on the degree of bargaining
co-ordination within nations. Sections 4 and 5 turn to the issue of how equilibrium
real wage and unemployment levels may be influenced by the EMU. Section 4
discusses the consequences of both deeper product market integration and the change
in the interaction between wage bargaining and monetary policy implied by monetary
unification. Section 5 analyses how the bargaining structure is likely to respond to the
effects of the EMU on equilibrium unemployment. Section 6 discusses other
influences on the degree of bargaining co-ordination. Section 7 asks the question of
whether product market integration and centralized monetary policy in the EMU
                                                          
1 I have treated these issues elsewhere. See e.g. Calmfors (1998a,b; 2000; 2001). Other references are
Sibert and Sutherland (2000), Gr￿ner and Hefeker (1998), and Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2000).2
could lead to transnational co-ordination of wage bargaining at the European level.
Section 8 summarises the analysis.
2.  The EMU and nominal wage flexibility
My starting point here is that the EMU will probably increase the demand for nominal
wage flexibility, because there is a need for alternative adjustment mechanisms when
there is no longer a domestic monetary policy. The argument rests on either the risk of
asymmetric demand shocks (Calmfors et al., 1997; Obstfeld, 1998) or the risk that a
common monetary policy could affect the various economies differently (Dornbusch
et al., 1998). Conditional on the assumption that there is such an increased demand for
nominal wage flexibility, I shall ask the question of whether it is likely to be
forthcoming.
There are at least three relevant ways of analysing nominal wage flexibility in
this context. According to the first approach, nominal wage rigidity is the result of
long contract periods. The length of contract periods can be seen as the outcome of a
trade-off. On the one hand, there is an incentive for long contract periods to hold
down negotiation costs, including the risk of labour-market conflicts. On the other
hand, there is an incentive to set wages for so short contract periods that it will be
possible to react to unforeseen events. If EMU membership means larger demand
disturbances, it follows therefore that there is an incentive for shorter contract periods.
But at least some assessments indicate that a shorter duration of wage contracts will
probably counteract the tendency to larger output and employment variations to a
rather small extent (Ball et al., 1988; Calmfors, 1998a). Comparing with the past, one
should also remember that lower inflation, which is likely to be associated with lower
variability of the inflation rate, works in the direction of longer contract periods. The
reason is that there is then less need for frequent revisions of nominal wage levels and
the real wage consequences of given nominal wage changes are easier to forecast
(Ball et al., 1988; Gottfries, 1992; Calmfors et al., 1997).
According to another view, nominal wage rigidity in downswings have more
to do with existing social norms about fairness: firms do not want to cut money wages
because this would have a negative impact on workforce morale and reduce3
productivity (Solow, 1979; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Although we are not able to
give rational explanations for such downward rigidity, we know from many survey
studies that nominal wage cuts are usually not regarded as acceptable (Bewley, 1998).
More severe consequences of asymmetric shocks in the EMU could change these
attitudes, but experience indicates that nominal wage cuts are accepted only in very
extreme situations, such as when the survival of a firm is at stake. So, it is quite
possible that EMU membership is too small a regime change to change the social
norms regarding wage cuts. An interesting perspective is given by two recent studies
by Agell and Lundborg (1995, 1999). The two studies asked similar questions to
Swedish personnel managers in 1991 and 1998 about their judgements on the
acceptability of wage cuts. Despite the fact that Sweden between these years moved
from stable low unemployment to high unemployment (much higher than any time
before in the post-war period) and from high inflation to a credible low-inflation
regime, there was no change in attitudes between the two studies. This suggests that
even very large macroeconomic regime shifts may be insufficient to change the
attitudes to wage cuts in unionised labour markets.
A third approach focuses explicitly on the bargaining game between
employers and employees (Holden, 1994). The starting point is the observation that
open labour-market conflict is not the only alternative to agreement on a new wage
contract. Indeed, the common practice is almost everywhere that production continues
with the same money wage as in the old contract until a new one is concluded. The
consequence may be nominal wage rigidity: if there is only a moderate change in
nominal demand, it will pay for neither employers nor unions to initiate a labour-
market conflict to change the wage. The upshot is again that, even if the EMU implies
larger demand fluctuations, these may not be sufficiently large to change wage-setting
behaviour.
Theoretical reasoning would thus seem to warn against expecting that nominal
wages will automatically become so much more flexible in the EMU that they can
offset a tendency towards more cyclical variability. Looking at the actual experiences
in the 1980s and 1990s of Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands, the countries
with the most binding hard-currency policies in the ERM, one does not find any
examples of aggregate nominal wage reductions even in years with very high
unemployment (although the Netherlands provide an example of nominal wage cuts
in the public sector after the Wassenaar agreement in 1982) (Calmfors, 1998a;4
Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 4). There are a few studies that point to larger nominal
wage flexibility in some countries after joining the ERM than earlier, but there are
also studies that do not find such an effect (Eichengreen, 1998). In general, it has not
been possible to show that a larger amount of nominal demand shocks lead to more
nominal wage and price flexibility (Ball et al., 1988; Layard et al., 1991).
3.  EMU, nominal wage flexibility and bargaining institutions
So far I have implicitly assumed that wage bargaining institutions are not affected by
the EMU. This is, however, a strong assumption. Indeed, monetary unification might
have profound effects on bargaining structure. Below, I argue that the EMU is likely
to promote national co-ordination of wage bargaining, because the social actors will
see the need for more nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for a domestic monetary
policy, and because such co-ordination is likely to be perceived as a means for
achieving this.
3.1. Nominal wage flexibility and bargaining co-ordination
There are several arguments for why co-ordinated wage bargaining at the
national level would promote nominal wage flexibility.
(i) One argument goes back to Keynes (1936). He argued that the concerns of
employees over relative wages would make them oppose money-wage cuts, unless all
wages could be cut simultaneously, so as to preserve existing wage differentials.
Although Keynes￿ conjecture has been questioned for the US on the ground that
employees seem to have ￿little systematic knowledge of pay rates at other firms￿
(Bewley, 1998), evidence for a highly unionised economy such as Sweden indicates
that inter-firm comparisons do play an important role (Agell and Lundborg, 1995,
1999).
(ii) A modern version of Keynes￿ argument has been advanced by Ball and
Romer (1991) in a framework of multiple equilibria. They stressed how the benefit of
changing the wage (and thus the price) in an individual firm depends, via product
demand interrelationships, on whether or not other firms do the same. With small
demand shocks, adjustment costs make it unprofitable for each firm to change the
wage even if others do. With very large shocks, it will always pay to adjust the wage5
independently of what others do. But for shocks of intermediate size, the individual
wage setter may gain from adjusting the wage only if others do the same. Which
equilibrium that materialises depends on the expectations of what other wage setters
will do. Co-ordination of wage bargaining is a way of removing this indeterminacy
and securing that the economy ends up in a good equilibrium in which wages adjust
to shocks.
(iii) One obvious explanation of the difficulty of adjusting money wages in a
decentralized system is that pay deals are then usually unsynchronised. In contrast,
there is automatic synchronisation of pay changes across the economy when different
firms or sectors delegate bargaining to peak-level organisations. Also when the
formal contracts are concluded at a lower level, synchronisation can be achieved
either because the peak-level organisations can affect the timing of negotiations (as in
Austria) or because of more informal mechanisms of co-ordination (as in Japan and
Sweden) (Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 4).
(iv) In systems with decentralized wage setting, contract length may be chosen
in a socially inefficient way (Ball, 1987). Most notably, there exists an aggregate-
demand externality: wage setters in an individual bargaining area do not take into
account that a long-term wage contract on their part will contribute to aggregate
demand fluctuations in the economy. The reason is that money-wage stickiness in a
part of the economy means lower flexibility of the aggregate price level in the case of
nominal shocks. If bargaining is co-ordinated, wage setters can internalise this
externality.
2 This effect tends to make wage contracts shorter under co-ordinated than
under uncoordinated bargaining.
(v) Finally, there is the possibility that the interests of outsiders with a weak
affiliation to the labour market are taken into account to a larger extent when
bargaining is co-ordinated across the economy, because unions then make more
economy-wide considerations. Gottfries (1992) has emphasised how the majority of
employed insiders, with a small lay-off risk, are likely to prefer contracts that fix
money wages for a long period of time when inflation is low and stable, because real
wage developments then become easy to predict, at the same time as employment
variations will mainly affect outsiders.
                                                          
2 Ball (1987) also points to another externality when the choice of contract length is decentralized and
contracts are unsynchronised. It arises because each wage setter will then not take into account that an6
Somewhat surprisingly, there does not exist much systematic empirical
research on the relationship between bargaining co-ordination and nominal wage
flexibility. However, two recent studies find some support for the view that more co-
ordination could promote nominal wage flexibility. According to Thomas (2001), the
responsiveness of nominal wage changes to unemployment has decreased in countries
that have moved from high to intermediate bargaining co-ordination (Finland, Spain
and Sweden), whereas it has increased in countries that have moved in the direction of
more co-ordination (Norway and Italy). Groth and Johansson (2001) found that a
move to higher bargaining co-ordination reduces the length of wage contracts at low
levels of co-ordination, but that it increases it at high levels of co-ordination.
3
3.2. The incentives for national bargaining co-ordination in the EMU
If co-ordinated wage bargaining is perceived to increase nominal wage flexibility,
monetary unification may create incentives for such bargaining arrangements. The
strength of these incentives will depend on actual macroeconomic developments. If
cyclical developments turn out to diverge strongly among the countries in the euro
area, then there will be strong incentives in the countries experiencing the most
serious recessionary shocks. But the incentives are likely to be there also in the
absence of actual macroeconomic imbalances. One reason could be a desire to avoid
that occasional wage hikes occur ￿by accident￿, the output and employment
consequences of which would be more difficult to handle in the EMU than earlier.
Another reason is that the mere uncertainty of the macroeconomic consequences of
the EMU ￿ and the risk of very large imbalances at specific occasions ￿ may imply a
precautionary motive for co-ordination of wage bargaining.
4 It will be much easier to
achieve co-ordinated wage restraint in times of crisis, if there is some co-ordination
also under more normal conditions. This may create an incentive for co-ordination
efforts as a stand-by measure for the future.
                                                                                                                                                                     
increase in contract length will lead to lower real wage variability in other bargaining areas, which will
increase welfare there. This effect works in the opposite direction to the aggregate-demand externality.
3 The above results should be compared with earlier results in Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988) and
Layard et al. (1991), according to which wages tended to respond less to consumer price changes the
more ￿corporatist￿ the economy. However, these earlier results may have been driven largely by the
increase in inflation associated with the supply shocks of the 1970s and reflect that higher bargaining
co-ordination leads to more real wage restraint in such a situation.
4 Visser (1998a,b). The argument has similarities with the precautionary motive for government labour-
market reform advanced by Calmfors (1998a,b; 2001).7
  One example of how a particular form of bargaining co-ordination can be used
as a ￿stand-by facility￿ is provided by the so-called buffer funds, which were set up in
Finland in 1997 through an agreement between the central labour market
organisations.
5 The background is a system where unemployment insurance and
pensions to a large extent are financed by employer contributions that have been
negotiated between unions and employer organisations. The idea of the buffer funds is
to raise these negotiated employer contributions above the disbursements for
unemployment benefits and pensions in cyclical upswings. The additional proceeds
are put in funds, which are to be spent in recessions in order to prevent contributions
from then having to be raised when employment falls.
The Finnish system has been devised to avoid countercyclical variations in
employer contributions, and thus in wage costs, which tend to exacerbate the
fluctuations in output and employment. A more ambitious system could instead aim at
actually lowering wage costs in deep recessions. This would amount to establishing
an ex ante machinery for cuts in money wage costs without having to cut money
wages. This idea is now being discussed in Sweden as a preparation for future EMU
membership (Calmfors, 1998a; 2000) and is presently examined by a government
commission.
4.  EMU and the equilibrium real wage and employment levels with given
bargaining institutions
The next issue is how the EMU might affect the equilibrium levels of real wages and
employment. Here, two basic mechanisms have been emphasised in the literature. The
first is that monetary unification is likely to promote product market integration. The
second mechanism is that the interaction between monetary policy and wage
bargaining is changed. Both mechanisms are treated below.
4.1. Product market integration
It is a common argument that monetary unification will increase product market
integration, and therefore also competition. One reason is that a common currency
reduces both transaction costs and exchange-rate risks with international payments,
                                                          
5 The system is described in Boldt (1998), Calmfors (1998a), Holm et al. (1999), and Pochet (1999a).8
and therefore leads to both more trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Another
reason is that international price comparisons are facilitated. As a consequence,
product demand should become more price-elastic. This will affect labour markets in
two ways (Layard et al., 1991; Nickell et al., 1994). First, more price-elastic product
demand means that labour demand becomes more wage-elastic, which puts downward
pressure on real wages. Second, more price-elastic product demand means that firms
will lower their price mark-ups on marginal costs, which raises output and
employment at given real wages. Theoretically, the effect on the equilibrium real
wage level is ambiguous, but clearly equilibrium employment increases.
 How shall one judge the effects I have described? One needs obviously to
look at all the links in the chain: EMU → product market integration → product
market competition → wages and employment.
Consider first the link between the EMU and product market integration. The
problem is to know how much the ongoing process of increasing international product
market integration is affected by the common currency. Both theoretical and empirical
research have produced ambiguous results. Theoretically, one cannot rule out that
exchange-rate variations could lead to more trade and FDI, as it is possible that
exchange-rate uncertainty increases the expected marginal return to these activities
(DeGrauwe, 1988; Flam and Jansson, 2000). (This occurs if the return is a convex
function of the exchange rate.) Several empirical studies find that reduced exchange-
rate fluctuations increase trade, but surprisingly many studies have been unable to
come up with any such effects (Flam and Jansson, 2000; Rose, 2000). However, it is
conceivable that a common currency, which eliminates all exchange rate risk in
connection with trade within the currency area, could have much larger effects than a
reduction of exchange-rate variability between different currencies. The recent study
by Rose (2000) supports this view.
6
Second, it is not necessarily the case that increased product market integration
means more competition. The opening up of domestic markets may help large-scale
multinational firms expand, which in the long run could actually reduce the amount of
competition in national product markets (Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 3). It should be
noted that according to a recent study (Nicoletti et al., 2001), price convergence does
                                                          
6 It is, however, difficult to know how strong conclusions to draw from this study, as it cannot get
round the problem that most of the countries that have adopted a common currency are small and very
atypical.9
not appear to have been significantly stronger between the EU countries that have
succeeded the best in stabilising their mutual exchange rates (Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) than between the EU countries in
general. However, product market integration in the form of an expansion of
European multinationals could still create incentives for wage moderation, because
these firms can credibly threaten to relocate production among units in different
countries in the case of wage pressures at a specific production site.
Consider then finally the link between product market competition and wages.
The strength of this link depends on the degree of national co-ordination in wage
bargaining. To the extent that there is a hump-shaped relationship between the degree
of bargaining co-ordination and the aggregate real wage level of the Calmfors-Driffill
type (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Calmfors, 1993b), it is well-known that the hump
with intermediate co-ordination (bargaining at the industry level) is likely to be
flattened by increased foreign competition in the product market (Danthine and Hunt,
1994). This is illustrated in Figure 1. The explanation is that the incentives for wage
moderation are strong anyway at both low and high levels of national co-ordination
(because of competition between domestic firms in the first case, and because of
internalisation of negative externalities of wage increases in the second case), which
means that increased product market competition then does not make so much
difference.
7 But it will make a large difference with industry bargaining, in which
case the incentives for wage restraint are weakened because all domestic competitors
are exposed to similar wage increases. This wage-raising effect is obviously of lesser
importance, the larger is the risk to lose market shares to foreign competitors. Since
industry bargaining is still the dominant form of wage bargaining in the euro countries
(Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 4), increased product market competition from other EU
countries could thus have potentially large effects.
Considering all these arguments, it is difficult to arrive at any definite
conclusions on the importance of the links between the EMU, integration, product
market competition and wage bargaining.
                                                          
7 The negative externalities on other groups of wage increases for one group include a higher aggregate
price level, a smaller tax base, higher costs for unemployment benefits, higher aggregate
unemployment and jealousy effects (Calmfors, 1993a).10
4.2. The interaction with monetary policy
Several recent papers have dealt with the interaction between monetary policy and
wage  setting. The starting point is that co-ordinated wage setters will act
strategically and take the anticipated monetary policy responses of central banks to
wage settlements into account. Two mechanisms have been emphasised. The first
focuses on the existence of an inflation bias for monetary policy, which co-ordinated
unions might want to influence. The second mechanism concentrates instead on how
central bank responses to inflation will affect the perceived employment costs of wage
increases.
The starting point for the inflation-bias argument is the Barro and Gordon
(1983) analysis of an inflation bias for monetary policy. They pointed to how a policy
maker concerned with both inflation and unemployment has an incentive to pursue
inflationary policies when equilibrium unemployment is higher than the policy
maker￿s unemployment goal. This gives rise to an inflation bias, which is increasing
in the deviation between equilibrium unemployment and the unemployment goal. The
argument is now that non-atomistic wage setters in an economy with co-ordinated
bargaining and a flexible exchange rate will realize that they can influence the
inflation bias of monetary policy through their real wage decisions, as these affect
equilibrium unemployment (Skott, 1997; Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Velasco and
Guzzo, 1999). So, if unions are concerned about inflation (in addition to real wages
and employment), they have an incentive to compromise on their real wage objectives
in order to reduce equilibrium unemployment, because this induces the central bank to
pursue a policy that leads to lower inflation. Such interaction between wage setters
and the central bank thus adds a motive for wage restraint in an economy where the
national central bank can control monetary policy. But this incentive is lost once the
country is in the EMU, because national wage setters will then be too small relative to
the ECB to affect its behaviour, even if they co-ordinate nationally. So for this reason,
real wages should become higher inside than outside the EMU.
According to the second approach, unions set wages by trading off real wages
against unemployment, but without caring about inflation per se (Soskice and Iversen,
1998, 2000; Corricelli et al., 2000). Central bank behaviour is now important because
it may affect this trade-off. Put differently, the incentives for wage restraint depend on
the effective elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages. If unions, bargaining11
in a co-ordinated way, realise that wage increases that threaten the price stability goal
of the central bank will trigger an interest-rate rise, they have to count on a larger fall
in employment in the case of a wage rise than would otherwise be the case (a higher
effective elasticity of labour demand). An extra incentive for wage restraint is then
added outside the EMU, because central bank policy works as a deterrent to wage
increases. But inside the EMU, also nationally co-ordinated wage setters will be so
small relative to the ECB that they will not anticipate any interest-rate response to
their actions. So in this case, too, the incentives for real wage restraint are weakened
by EMU membership.
Although both the arguments reviewed motivate why EMU membership could
weaken the incentives for wage restraint, the two types of reasoning are not equally
plausible. There are good reasons to be sceptical to the inflation-bias argument. On
the face of it, this reasoning might seem to provide an explanation of the combination
of real wage restraint and high inflation, which was a characteristic feature of the
Scandinavian economies in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s when
bargaining was highly centralized (Calmfors, 1993b). But yet the argument is an
implausible one, as it would imply a situation where the typical trade union behaviour
is to urge inflation-prone central banks to tighten monetary policy, so that unions
would face less need to compromise on their real wage objectives. This has certainly
not been the typical situation even in the Scandinavian countries, and is, of course,
even less plausible in a situation with independent central banks, focusing on price
stability as their prime objective.
The deterrent argument is much more plausible, as it is consistent with the
traditional roles of unions and central banks we observe. A few caveats should,
however, be raised. First, although there is some empirical support in favour of this
hypothesis, the results are not clear-cut. One prediction is that the wage-restraining
effect of a domestic anti-inflationary policy should be the greatest under intermediate
co-ordination. With very decentralized bargaining, there should be negligible effects
because wage setters are then too small to act strategically. With a high degree of co-
ordination, the incentives for wage restraint may be very strong anyway, because
other negative externalities of high wages are internalised, so anticipated monetary
policy reactions may then not make much difference (Corricelli et al., 2000; Soskice
and Iversen, 2000). Iversen (1998a,b) did indeed find such a pattern, but the results of
Hall and Franzese (1998) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999) give only partial support12
for these theoretical predictions.
8 Given the limited number of observations of
different combinations of bargaining structure and monetary regime, it is perhaps not
surprising that the empirical results are not robust. The most that can be said is
probably that there is some  evidence that anti-inflationary monetary policy has
favourable employment effects under intermediate co-ordination of bargaining, i.e.
under the conditions prevailing in most EU countries.
Second, the impact of EMU membership obviously depends on the alternative
monetary regime. The deterrent argument was developed to explain the earlier wage
restraint in Germany with the interaction between the trade union movement and the
Bundesbank. Because of Germany￿s leading role in the ERM, the Bundesbank was
free to adjust monetary policy to domestic price stability objectives (Hall and
Franzese, 1998; Soskice and Iversen, 1998). The reasoning seems also now to apply
to Sweden, which is outside the ERM with a flexible exchange rate, and where the
central bank appears to have established credibility for its inflation target. In fact,
Swedish trade unions have recently been running internal campaigns in order to
convince their rank-and-file membership of the need to adjust wage policy to the anti-
inflationary monetary policy stance, which is very much in line with the deterrent
argument (Calmfors, 2000).
It is not entirely clear how the deterrent argument applies to the other
countries that were members of the earlier ERM. With monetary policy tied down by
a credible fixed exchange rate in Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, domestic monetary policy could not deter wage increases. But on the
other hand, the interaction between the German central bank and wage setters may
have helped keep down wage increases also in the other ERM countries because of
competition effects (Hochreiter and Winckler, 1995; Visser, 1998a,b; Pochet, 1999b).
But it is reasonable to expect the wage-restraining effects of anticipated Bundesbank
responses to be stronger in Germany than in the other ERM countries. The empirical
picture in the 1980s, with lower nominal wage increases in Germany than in the other
ERM countries (except in the Netherlands), is consistent with this conjecture (see
Table 1). But on the face of it, the picture in the 1990s, when wages increased faster
                                                          
8 Hall and Franzese (1998) found that higher central bank independence increases unemployment at
low levels of bargaining co-ordination, but that this effect becomes smaller at higher levels of co-
ordination (and is possibly reversed at very high levels). Cukierman and Lippi (1999) found that higher
central bank independence reduces unemployment with intermediate co-ordination, but raises it with
decentralization.13
in Germany than in the other ERM countries in the table is not (although the demand
pressure in the wake of re-unification may be part of the explanation).
For a country like Italy, the deterrent argument may not be applicable at all. If
the alternative to EMU membership is a soft monetary policy, where the central bank
is expected ultimately to react to inflationary wage increases by an accommodating
policy, the argument would be reversed. EMU membership would then increase the
incentives for wage restraint. Similar reasoning might perhaps hold also for Finland,
which has a long history of devaluations in the post-war period.
5.  EMU, equilibrium unemployment and bargaining institutions
My analysis of the effect of the EMU on equilibrium real wages and unemployment
has so far built on an assumption of unchanged bargaining institutions, just as I started
out the discussion of nominal wage flexibility. In a similar way as there, I shall now
widen the analysis and discuss how the ceteris paribus effects on equilibrium real
wages and unemployment may create incentives to change bargaining institutions.
The discussion will be based on the assumption that the deterrent argument is valid.
Holden (2001) has advanced the argument that higher equilibrium
unemployment inside than outside the EMU under intermediate bargaining co-
ordination, due to the change in the interaction between monetary policy and wage
setting, would strengthen the incentives for bargaining co-ordination in countries like
Germany and Sweden. The reason is that co-ordination and domestic anti-inflationary
monetary policy can be regarded as substitutes for each other when it comes to
disciplining wage setters. As discussed in Section 3.2, the threat of monetary policy
reactions may be necessary to hold back wages in an economy with intermediate
bargaining co-ordination (sectoral wage bargaining). But with high co-ordination, the
incentives for wage restraint could be so strong anyway that a domestic anti-
inflationary monetary policy may not add very much. The loss of domestic monetary
policy as a disciplining device in the EMU may therefore lead to substantially higher
unemployment with intermediate bargaining co-ordination, but could have a small
effect with highly co-ordinated bargaining. For this reason, EMU membership could
strengthen the incentives for national co-ordination: the welfare loss for a sectoral14
union of reneging on co-ordinated agreements, and bargaining instead on its own, is
larger when there is no domestic central bank that can make up for lack of co-
ordination.
9
The Holden argument focuses on the incentives for upholding co-ordination at
the national level versus bargaining at the industry level. However, another relevant
comparison is between industry-level bargaining and decentralized bargaining at the
level of the firm. Industry-level bargaining will be more favourable as compared to
decentralized bargaining outside the EMU, when monetary policy is pursued by an
anti-inflationary domestic central bank, than inside the EMU. The reason is again that
the monetary policy reactions to wage settlements are partly internalised outside the
EMU, whereas there is no such internalisation inside the EMU. As a consequence, the
incentive to move from intermediate co-ordination to decentralization are stronger
inside than outside the EMU. So, one could also argue that, for this reason, EMU
membership may strengthen the incentives for decentralized wage bargaining at the
level of the firm in countries like Germany and Sweden.
Both the arguments above suggest that the change in the interaction between
monetary policy and wage setting implied by the EMU will weaken the incentives for
intermediate bargaining co-ordination. But it is not theoretically evident whether the
incentives for co-ordination or the incentives for decentralization are strengthened the
most.
6.  Future bargaining institutions
Summing up my discussion so far, there are theoretical arguments for why the EMU
might promote national co-ordination of wage bargaining. Both a need for greater
nominal wage flexibility and a tendency to higher equilibrium unemployment,
because of the change in the interaction between monetary policy and wage
bargaining, might work in this direction (although the nominal flexibility argument
appears to be more clear-cut than the equilibrium unemployment argument).
                                                          
9 Technically, the likelihood of co-ordination (co-operation) can by analysed by examining the
incentives for an individual union to renege on such a solution. The assumption is then that reneging
causes future co-ordination to break down for a finite or infinite period of time. The smaller the future
welfare loss from this to be set against the immediate gain from defecting, the lower is the discount rate
required to uphold co-ordination (Holden, 2001).15
6.1. Actual developments
To what extent do actual developments of bargaining structure underpin the
conjectures above? Table 2 from Calmfors et al. (2001), which is based on work by
Visser (2000), is an attempt to quantify how the degree of bargaining co-ordination
has evolved over time in a number of European countries.
Comparing the 1970s with the 1990s, there is a clear trend in the direction of
decentralization. Such a development occurred in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The only
exceptions are Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.
However, a comparison of the 1980s and 1990s gives a somewhat different
picture. Between these periods, there has been an increase in bargaining co-ordination
in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is interesting to note that
these countries represent six of the ten countries in the table opting for EMU
membership. But it should also be noted that in most of the cases (Austria, Belgium,
Italy and Spain), the ￿recentralization￿ did only make up partially for the earlier move
in the direction of decentralization.
  Somewhat paradoxically, the return to higher bargaining co-ordination in
many EU countries has occurred at the same time as there has been a tendency to
more of formal dececentralization of wage bargaining in the sense that actual wage
contracts have been concluded at lower levels (Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 4). The co-
ordination attempts have taken the form of so-called social pacts on wage moderation.
There are broad agreements on guidelines for nominal wage increases between union
confederations (or a number of industry unions) and employer associations.
Sometimes such agreements have been bipartite, sometimes they have involved the
government as a third party. These agreements can be seen as a way of substituting
consensual norms and moral suasion for formal centralisation of wage bargaining in a
situation when the general development towards lower-level bargaining has made
such centralization impossible (Visser, 1998a,b; Crouch, 2000a,b).
Social pacts have occurred in the 1980s and 1990s especially in the countries
that opted for a non-accommodating monetary regime within the ERM and later for
membership in the EMU (see e.g. Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 4; EIRO (2000); or
Pochet, 1999c). The prime examples are the Netherlands and Ireland. The Dutch
Wassenaar agreement on wage moderation in 1982, and subsequent agreements, did16
not formally involve the government, but were concluded under the implicit threat of
government intervention. In Ireland, the government has been a direct party to the
agreements exchanging tax cuts for wage restraint. Other examples of social pacts
include Finland, Greece, Italy and Portugal and to a lesser extent Belgium, Germany
and Spain.
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The social pacts of the 1980s and 1990s can be explained by the incentives
created when it became increasingly clear that the high unemployment at the time
necessitated downward real wage adjustments, which in the ERM system could only
be accomplished through money wage restraint. One should expect the EMU to
provide similar incentives.
The incentives for national bargaining co-ordination are likely to differ
between actors. Governments should be the  ones most interested in finding a
substitute for lost policy instruments. Employers may be less interested, as they are
likely to regard decentralization as the first-best option for reasons to be discussed in
the next section. But at the same time, employers may also see the benefits of
achieving wage moderation through co-ordination rather than through a lengthy and
uncertain process of labour-market reforms, involving serious political conflicts. For
unions, the exercise of nominal wage restraint may face internal opposition, but in a
situation when they are losing ground (see the discussion in the next section),
demonstrating their capacity as a social actor by entering into social pacts may be
regarded as a way of obtaining legitimacy (Crouch, 2000a).
6.2. The ultimate breakdown of national bargaining co-ordination
Even though the EMU is likely to promote national co-ordination of wage bargaining,
the incentives may be weaker once the EMU has materialised than during the run-up
to the EMU when there was a strong desire in many countries, viz. Belgium and the
Southern European countries, to make their economies fit for EMU membership
(Streeck, 1998). One could perhaps also argue that the high unemployment in the EU
countries in the 1990s was particularly conducive to co-ordinated wage restraint.
                                                          
10 Norway and Sweden are examples outside the EMU. Norway has a long tradition of ￿social
contracts￿. In Sweden, the 1997 ￿Industrial agreement￿ between a number of unions and employer
associations might perhaps to some extent be seen as a preparation for later EMU membership
(Elvander, 1999).17
One must also take other factors affecting bargaining structure into account.
Table 2 illustrates what appears to be a long-run development in the direction of
decentralization. This development has been driven by the employer side and there
are reasons to expect it to continue, because the same factors as in recent decades
seem still to be at work. These factors include: (i) more decentralized decision-
making within flatter hierarchical business organisations, which has been argued to
require less standardised pay systems and more pay differentiation to create
appropriate incentives for employees (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000); (ii) stronger
international competition, which makes it more important to adjust wage costs to
foreign competitors rather than to secure a ￿level playing field￿ in the sense of equal
wages across the domestic economy (Crouch, 2000a,b); and (iii) a desire to limit the
political power of unions by limiting their role as a national actor (Elvander, 1999;
Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 6).
The development towards more decentralization could also be seen as an
outcome of ￿bargaining￿ between unions and employers about the level at which wage
negotiations should take place. To the extent that the relative bargaining strength of
employers has increased, they may have been able to shift the locus of wage
bargaining in their preferred direction (Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 6). One possible
reason for such a shift in bargaining power is the increasing degree of capital
mobility, which gives the employer side a better ￿fall-back￿ position in the case of
disagreement with unions.
Another explanation of the shift in bargaining power in favour of employers is
deunionisation, i.e. the fall in union density rates, in most European countries. This
tendency has been documented in Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and Calmfors et al.
(2001), who show that average union density in Western Europe has declined from 44
percent in 1979 to 32 percent in 1998. This development seems to be related to on-
going structural changes, which are likely to exert continuing downward pressures on
union density rates: the relative shift in employment from manufacturing and the
public sector to private services and the growing importance of part-time work and
temporary employment contracts.
11
                                                          
11 The reductions in union density in most Western European countries have probably also to some
extent been driven by the rise in unemployment that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, a development
that is now probably being reversed to some extent. However, econometric estimates by Checchi in
Calmfors et al. (2001) suggest that the adjustment speed may have been so slow that union membership
towards the end of the 1990s had adjusted only partially to the earlier rise in unemployment. This18
I have argued that EMU membership implies important benefits of national
bargaining co-ordination. But the ongoing structural changes working in the direction
of decentralization may eventually overtake the forces promoting bargaining co-
ordination. If formal wage contracts are increasingly concluded at more decentralized
levels, the costs of co-ordination increase. And to the extent that lower rates of
unionisation are associated with lower coverage of collective agreements, the benefits
of co-ordination will gradually decrease. The reason is that co-ordination of union
contracts produce more favourable results the more employees that are encompassed,
as the extent of internalisation of externalities then is larger (Holden and Raaum,
1991). In addition, lower union membership could mean that the legitimacy of
moderating wage agreements struck by unions is reduced and thus also the incentives
to abide by them.
These considerations suggest that bargaining co-ordination through social
pacts and consensual norms is likely to work only up to a point. In a long-term
perspective, such co-ordination will probably be increasingly difficult to sustain. So,
my conclusion is that national bargaining co-ordination in the EMU will probably
only represent a transitional phase (say for the next 10-15 years) and will ultimately
break down. But it is hard to predict how this transition will occur. One possibility is
that the attempts at national co-ordination become less and less effective and just
￿fade away￿. However, it is also possible that the breakdown could be quite a ￿bumpy
ride￿. This would be the case if a failure of unions to deliver co-ordinated wage
restraint in times of macroeconomic crisis provoke governments to take more drastic
actions to hold back wages. One possibility could be more direct government
interventions in the wage-setting process through legislation on wage increases, as has
occurred in recent years in Belgium.
12 Such attempts seem bound ultimately to fail,
either because they cannot be enforced or because they impose inefficient relative-
wage rigidities, but they could still lead to serious political and social conflicts before
they are abandoned.
                                                                                                                                                                     
means that a return to somewhat lower unemployment ￿ but still higher than in the 1960s and 1970s ￿
may not be enough for exerting a strong effect in the opposite direction.
12 In 1996-98, legislation set a maximum for wage increases at the company and sector levels.
Subsequent wage bargaining has also occurred within strict legal limits allowing sanctions against
companies and sectors that exceed the norms for wage increases (Pochet, 1999b).19
6.3. The economic consequences of a move towards decentralization
What will be the macroeconomic consequences if there is a long-run shift towards
decentralized bargaining at the level of the firm? One probable effect, which follows
from the analysis in Section 3, is that nominal wage flexibility will be reduced. This
will have adverse effects on the possibility to cope with asymmetric shocks in the
EMU.
Another issue is the effect on equilibrium real wage and employment levels. A
number of empirical studies on panel data for the OECD countries have examined the
relationship between the degree of bargaining co-ordination and unemployment
(controlling for other factors). These studies are summarised in Table 3.
13 Broadly
speaking, half of the studies have found the relationship to be hump-shaped in line
with the Calmfors-Driffil (1988) hypothesis, and half of the studies have found it to
be monotonic (with more co-ordination always leading to lower unemployment). So,
there is disagreement on the effect of moving from intermediate to low co-ordination.
But the two sets of studies do agree that highly co-ordinated bargaining seems to lead
to much lower unemployment than highly decentralized bargaining. Ceteris paribus,
unemployment is on average 4.9 percentage points lower under high co-ordination
than under decentralization in the studies with a hump-shaped relationship and 7.1
percentage points lower in the studies finding a monotonic relationship.
If one takes the studies at face value, they suggest that a move over the long
run from highly co-ordinated bargaining (of the type that has occurred in many small
European countries) to highly decentralized bargaining would mean substantially
higher unemployment, everything else constant. However, everything else will not
remain constant, as the reduction of bargaining co-ordination, according to my
argument, is associated with factors such as increased international competition,
increased capital mobility and deunionisation, which are likely themselves to have
direct wage-reducing effects in addition to the effects working via changes in the
extent of bargaining co-ordination. In addition, these factors may facilitate
employment-promoting labour-market reforms of unemployment insurance,
employment protection legislation, tax systems etc. So, the general-equilibrium
                                                          
13 In the table, I have excluded the studies focusing on the interaction between monetary policy and
bargaining co-ordination because the results are not very robust. According to theory, the interaction
effects should not affect the comparison between very co-ordinated and very decentralized systems (see
Section 4.2).20
effects of lower bargaining co-ordination on employment remain unclear, even if the
partial-equilibrium effects are likely to be adverse.
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7. Transnational bargaining co-ordination at the European level
Finally, I shall discuss the possibility of  transnational co-ordination of wage-
bargaining at the EU level. There exist incentives for a development in this direction,
too.
First, it could be argued that the europeanisation of monetary policy makes it
natural to co-ordinate collective bargaining across borders. If the deterrent argument
in Section 4 holds true, there should be an incentive for unions to try to re-establish
the earlier game between the Bundesbank and the German trade unions at the
European level. If wage settlements are co-ordinated throughout the euro zone, wage
setters would once again internalise the anticipated monetary policy reactions (now of
the ECB) to their actions. According to my earlier reasoning, this would promote
wage restraint and would be welfare improving.
The Macroeconomic Dialogue within the framework of the Employment Pact,
which was established by the EU in 1999, could provide a framework for such a
development. The dialogue provides an arena where European-level union and
employer representatives regularly meet with the ECB (as well as with the
Commission and EU ministers of Finance) to discuss macroeconomic issues.
Transnational co-ordination of wage bargaining would make unions a more ￿equal￿
partner" to the ECB in this context.
Second, increased competition among firms in different European countries
could also be expected to strengthen the incentives for transnational co-ordination of
wage bargaining. Such co-ordination at the sectoral level would increase union
bargaining power, as similar wage increases in a sector across countries imply smaller
job losses than wage increases in a sector within one country only. The driving force
for transnational co-ordination of this type is similar to the one that has led to
bargaining at the sectoral level within nations. Such considerations seem to play a role
                                                          
14 Moreover, changes in the degree of bargaining co-ordination may, of course, affect variables like
production efficiency, growth and the ability to cope with local or sectoral shocks. To analyse these
issues is outside the scope of this paper.21
especially among German trade unions, where there appears to be a worry that
national attempts to achieve wage competitiveness will lead to a reduction of labour￿s
share of national income (Bispinck and Schulten, 1998).
Third, a similar argument holds to the extent that large multinational firms
have production units in different countries. Cross-border bargaining co-ordination
would be a natural response of unions to the increase in firms￿ bargaining power that
follows from the possibility to credibly threaten to reallocate production between
these units.
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There have been some ￿ small ￿ steps in the direction of transnational
bargaining co-ordination at the EU level. EU-wide agreements between the peak level
European union and employer confederations on some issues (such as minimum
provisions on parental leave and minimum rights of employees working part time or
on fixed-term employment contracts; see Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 6) have been
concluded. Within the EMF (the European Metal Workers￿ Federation), common
norms for wage policy have been agreed. In Germany and the Benelux countries,
union officials from the other countries have taken part in the negotiation processes at
the regional level.
However, although there are thus incentives for transnational co-ordination of
wage bargaining, the obstacles still appear huge. The main reason is that co-ordination
costs are probably very high because of the fundamental differences among European
countries with respect to a number of factors. These include the pay concepts
negotiated over, union-employer relations, bargaining arrangements, the norms that
guide wage demands and settlements, the structure of unions and employer
organisations, traditions of government involvement, traditions and norms with
respect to labour-market conflicts, the size of strike funds, procedures for dispute
settlement, etc.
Compared to other segments of society, unions have been lagging far behind
in the internationalisation process. The fact that the restructuring of unions through
mergers ￿ as a response to cost pressures and declining membership ￿ that is
                                                          
15 A possible objection to the argument is that multinational firms are often integrated vertically, with
production units in one country producing inputs for units in other countries. In that case, unions would
actually be better off by bargaining separately at each production site, as this would allow them to
￿divide the pie￿ several times with the firm (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). Then the employer has an
interest in bargaining jointly with the unions at all production sites. This may hold in a short-term
perspective. However, in a long-term perspective the mere existence of production units in different
countries gives the employer a credible option to choose where to locate new production.22
occurring in many countries has not yet involved any cross-border amalgamations is
evidence of this (Calmfors et al., 2001, Ch. 2). A plausible explanation is that
knowledge of labour-market relations is very country-specific. Another obstacle to
transnational bargaining co-ordination is probably insufficient knowledge of foreign
languages among (especially blue-collar) union representatives.
There is also strong opposition to transnational bargaining co-ordination from
employers. For example, in the metal industry ￿ which acts as pattern setter in wage
bargaining in many European countries ￿ there does not even exist a European peak-
level employer organisation. To the extent that there is a general long-run trend,
driven by employers, in the direction of decentralization, as we argued in Section 5.2,
this will also tend to counteract tendencies to higher-level transnational bargaining co-
ordination.
Finally, the gains to unions from transnational bargaining co-ordination within
the EU are reduced to the extent that competition comes from outside the EU.
Against this background, a development towards centralized wage bargaining
at the European level, and also sectoral wage agreements at the European level, seems
unlikely. Transnational co-ordination through pattern bargaining is somewhat more
probable. But the obstacles are great here, too. The main difficulty is the need to agree
on a wage leader. German unions ￿ viz. the IG Metall ￿ is the natural candidate, and
also appears to strive for such a role (Hege, 1999). Such German wage leadership
might be natural to accept for unions in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, where
comparisons with German wage developments have traditionally played an important
role. But unions in France, Spain and Italy ￿ not to mention the UK ￿ may oppose
being dominated by German unions (Burda, 1999). And German unions themselves
may have great difficulty convincing their rank-and-file membership that they should
take into account European rather than national conditions when they formulate their
wage demands. Perhaps most importantly, the declining importance of the
manufacturing sector makes it less natural for the IG Metall to act as wage leader.
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To the extent that there is a development in the direction of transnational co-
ordination of wage bargaining, it is most likely to occur within multinational firms.
This prediction rests on costs of co-ordination being smaller within multinationals
than among national sectoral unions or national union confederations in different
                                                          
16 An illustration of this is the fact that a new service-sector union that will be larger than the IG Metall
has now been formed in Germany.23
countries. There are several reasons for this. Similarities in production are likely to
mean that production units in different countries are exposed to similar supply-side as
well as demand-side shocks. Similarities in production also promote similar systems
of pay and other benefits. This is all the more likely to the extent that multinationals
apply similar management principles in all their units. Union co-ordination within
multinationals is also facilitated by the fact that employees in different countries
interact regularly in their normal work.
Moreover, union co-ordination may get a boost by the European Works
Councils. These are the result of a Commission directive in 1994. It required
multinational firms in the EU above a certain minimum size (1000 employees in total
and a minimum of 150 employees in at least two countries) to establish such works
councils. They represent institutionalised networks of employees across borders,
where local union representatives will meet regularly, and could provide a basis for
co-ordination of bargaining (Marginson and Sisson, 1998). Although formal
transnational co-ordination of wage bargaining within multinational firms may be far
off for reasons similar to the ones discussed above, one could conceive of a
development where common norms on pay setting develop within these firms, or
where some production units come to act as pattern setters for the rest. Such a
development would be consistent with the general development in the direction of
decentralized bargaining at the level of the firm, which was discussed in Section 5.2.
Summing up, my main conclusion is that higher-level co-ordination of wage
bargaining at the EU level is unlikely ever to fly because of the co-ordination costs
involved. It is true that there are factors tending to reduce these costs. One such factor
is that the common currency facilitates wage comparisons among countries. Another
factor is that EU decision-making in general provides an incentive for both unions and
employers in different member states to co-ordinate their views on various policy
issues to be able to exercise maximum influence in Brussels.
17 If procedures are
developed for forming common views at the European level in other fields, this might
help to reduce the costs of co-ordinating wage bargaining as well. My hypothesis is,
however, that these factors will be of much less importance than the general long-run
factors working in the direction of decentralized wage bargaining.
                                                          
17 The most obvious illustration is the fact that agreements between the peak-level European labour-
market organisations can be made legally binding in all the EU states through a directive by the
European Commission.24
8. Conclusions
I have surveyed the arguments on how the EMU may affect wage bargaining. The
incentives for nominal wage flexibility will probably be stronger when asymmetric
macroeconomic shocks can no longer be countered by national monetary policy,
although one should not expect a large effect. To the extent that there is such an
effect, it is likely to come about through stronger incentives for national co-ordination
of wage bargaining than would otherwise be the case.
The EMU may affect equilibrium real wages and employment (the average
real wage and employment levels over the cycle) through at least two mechanisms. To
the extent that the common currency promotes competition, it will tend to raise
employment. But it is difficult to judge whether or not this effect will be
quantitatively important. I put more emphasis on the change in the interaction
between monetary policy and wage setting that is implied by the EMU. This effect is
likely to increase wage pressure and thus to reduce equilibrium employment. But as a
consequence, there may be stronger incentives for national bargaining co-ordination,
as this may work as a substitute for the ￿deterrent effect￿ of anti-inflationary policy
outside the EMU.
My overall conclusion is thus that monetary unification will probably promote
national co-ordination of wage bargaining. As in recent years, co-ordination is likely
to take the form of the establishment of consensual norms and moral suasion within
various forms of social pacts. These may continue to play an important role in many
countries in the medium term (the next 10-15 years). But in a long-term perspective,
other forces working in the direction of decentralized bargaining and deunionisation
can be expected to dominate and lead to the breakdown of national bargaining co-
ordination. This could occur rather smoothly, but it could also involve serious
political and social conflicts if severe macroeconomic crises prompt governments to
intervene more directly in wage setting.
As to the likely macroeconomic consequences of such a long-run development
towards decentralized wage bargaining at the level of the firm, there is a presumption
that nominal wages will become more rigid. It is less clear how equilibrium real
wages and employment will be affected. Available empirical studies disagree on the
effects of a move from intermediate bargaining co-ordination to decentralized25
bargaining. But the studies do agree that decentralized bargaining will probably be
associated with substantially higher unemployment than highly co-ordinated wage
bargaining. This is, however, a partial-equilibrium result as it does not take into
account that the factors driving the decentralization process (globalisation,
deunionisation etc.) are likely to have direct employment-raising effect beside their
indirect effects though the degree of bargaining co-ordination.
Although factors such as the europeanisation of monetary policy and product
market integration provide incentives for transnational co-ordination of wage
bargaining at the EU level, such a development is not probable. It would be in direct
contradiction to the long-run development towards more decentralized bargaining that
I have outlined. Costs for higher-level transnational co-ordination of wage bargaining
are likely to remain prohibitively high. To the extent that there is such transnational
co-ordination, it is most likely to occur within multinational firms. In addition, some
higher-level transnational bargaining co-ordination on specific issues relating to non-
wage issues can be expected, but this will amount to much less than co-ordination of
actual wage bargaining.
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high oordinationTable 2: Bargaining authority and co-ordination
Distribution of bargaining authority C-index
w1 w2 w3
Austria 1973-77 0.8 0.2 0 0.82
1983-87 0.6 0.2 0 0.62
1993-97 0.6 0.4 0 0.65
Belgium 1973-77 0.52 0.48 0 0.52
1983-87 0.36 0.04 0 0.31
1993-97 0.4 0.56 0.04 0.42
Denmark 1973-77 0.8 0.2 0 0.64
1983-87 0.56 0.44 0 0.47
1993-97 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.34
Finland 1973-77 0.72 0.28 0 0.64
1983-87 0.72 0.28 0 0.58
1993-97 0.64 0.28 0.08 0.47
France 1973-77 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.10
1983-87 0.4 0.04 0.56 0.07
1993-97 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.08
Germany 1973-77 0.36 0.64 0 0.35
1983-87 0.2 0.8 0 0.26
1993-97 0.2 0.72 0.08 0.24
Ireland 1973-77 0.44 0 0.56 0.37
1983-87 0.32 0 0.68 0.27
1993-97 0.8 0 0.2 0.76
Italy 1973-77 0.4 0.28 0.32 0.38
1983-87 0.28 0.32 0.4 0.11
1993-97 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.32
Netherlands 1973-77 0.48 0.52 0 0.34
1983-87 0.6 0.4 0 0.45
1993-97 0.48 0.4 0.12 0.39
Norway 1973-77 0.76 0.24 0 0.42
1983-87 0.72 0.28 0 0.43
1993-97 0.72 0.28 0 0.42
Portugal 1973-77 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.22
1983-87 0.48 0.2 0.32 0.23
1993-97 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.28
Spain 1975-77 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.40
1983-87 0.44 0.28 0.28 0.22
1993-97 0.36 0.24 0.4 0.34
Sweden 1973-77 0.8 0.2 0 0.75
1983-87 0.48 0.52 0 0.49
1993-97 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.39
Switzerland 1973-77 0.2 0.8 0 0.21
1983-87 0.2 0.8 0 0.20
1993-97 0.2 0.72 0.08 0.19
UK 1973-77 0.44 0.28 0.28 0.37
1983-87 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.18
1993-97 0.2 0 0.8 0.1433
Notes: The co-ordination index C is defined as C =  (wj • pij
2),
 where wj is the relative bargaining
authority accorded to each bargaining level (the sum of all wj = 1), and pij is the share of union members
organised by the union (or confederation) i at level j. The wj:s measure the vertical dimension of co-
ordination and the pij:s the horizontal dimension. The overall index C captures both the horizontal and
vertical dimensions of bargaining co-ordination and varies between 0 and 1. Let j = 1 denote the national
(confederation) level, j = 2 the industry level, and j = 3 the local (firm) level. If all bargaining power is
concentrated at the national level and there is only one central union confederation, then both w1 = 1 and p11
= 1, and thus C = 1. If all bargaining is at the industry level, then w2 = 1, whereas all pi2 are numbers
between 0 and 1. It follows that C will then also be a number between 0 and 1. When bargaining is
occurring only at the local level, w3 = 1 but all pi3 will approximate 0, and C thus approaches 0.
Sources: Visser (2000) and Calmfors et al. (2001), Ch. 4.Table 3: Unemployment under various bargaining regimes (ceteris–paribus differences to
uncoordinated/decentralized systems) in various studies
a)











c) 2.6 - 1.5 Unemployment Centralization
2 Bleaney (1996)
d) 3.5 - 2.1 Unemployment Centralization/
co-ordination
3 Scarpetta (1996)
e) 0.9 - 12.0 Unemployment Centralization
4 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
f) 1.3 - 2.4 Unemployment Centralization
5 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
g) 1.2 - 4.4 Unemployment Centralization/
co-ordination
6 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
h) 6.9 -4.6 Unemployment Co-ordination
7 Daveri & Tabellini (2000)
i) 5.8 -7.2 Unemployment Geographical
j)
Average 3.2 -4.9 Unemployment










1 Layard et al. (1991) - 4.7 - 10.4 Unemployment Co-ordination
2 Zetterberg (1993)
k) - 0.4 - 2.4 Unemployment Centralisation
3 Scarpetta (1996)
l) - 6.2 - 12.3 Unemployment Co-ordination
4 Bleaney (1996)
m) - 2.0 - 3.9 Unemployment Co-ordination
5 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
n) - 0.8 - 5.7 Unemployment Co-ordination
6 Nickell & Layard (1999) - 4.6 - 6.0   Unemployment
o) Co-ordination
7 Blanchard & Wolfers (2000)
p) -4.4 -8.9 Unemployment Centralization
Average -3.3 -7.1 Unemployment
Notes:
a) The table shows how the unemployment rate under intermediate and high co-ordination differs from that under low co-
ordination when other factors are controlled for.
b) Measures of centralization capture the level at which actual bargaining takes place. Measures of co-ordination try to capture
informal co-ordination as well.
c) Equation (5) in Table 4.14. We have classified the countries ranked 1-3 and 7-9 as centralized, the countries ranked 13-17 as
intermediately centralized and the countries ranked 4-6 and 10-12 as decentralized.
d) Equation (4) in Table 5. Bleaney distinguishes between highly centralized systems, highly decentralized systems, moderately
centralized systems with a high degree of corporatism and moderately centralized systems with a low degree of corporatism. In
my table, the last two categories have been amalgamated to one.
e) Equation (8) in Table 1. The entry for intermediate centralisation refers to the country ranked 14 and the entry for co-ordination
to the country ranked 1. The comparison is with the country ranked 17.
f) Equation (2) in Table 2.
g) Equation (4) in Table 2.
h) Equation (4) in Table 4. In the equation, taxes and bargaining co-ordination are interacted. The effects are evaluated at the
average tax ratio for the sample period 1983-95.
i) Equation (5) in Table 9. In the equation, taxes and bargaining co-ordination are interacted. The effects are evaluated at the
average tax ratio for 1983-95.
j) This study associates the Scandinavian countries with high co-ordination, the European continental countries with intermediate
co-ordination, and the Anglo-Saxon countries with low co-ordination.
k) Equation (3) in Table 4.14. I have classified the countries ranked 1-5 as highly co-ordinated, the countries ranked 6-10 as
intermediately co-ordinated, and the countries ranked 11-17 as uncoordinated.
l) Equation (2) in Table 1.
m) Equation (1) in Table 5.
n) Equation (1) in Table 2.
o) The equation explains the log of the unemployment rate. In the calculation of the effect on the unemployment rate, I have
assumed that unemployment under decentralization is equal to the average rate of unemployment among the countries studied
during the estimation period.35
p) Equation (1) in Table 1. In the equation, macroeconomic shocks and the degree of bargaining co-ordination are interacted. The
entries show the differences in the increase of unemployment between the post-1995 period and the 1960-65 period.